The moral-principle objection to human embryonic stem cell research

被引：24
|
作者：
Marquis, Don [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Kansas, Dept Philosophy, Lawrence, KS 66045 USA
来源：
METAPHILOSOPHY | 2007年 / 38卷 / 2-3期
关键词：
abortion; future-of-value objection; embryo; human embryonic stem cell research; moral-principle argument; moral status; twinning; zygote;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1467-9973.2007.00481.x
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
Opponents of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research claim that such research is incompatible with the moral principle that it is always wrong intentionally to end a human life. In this essay, I discuss how that principle might be revised so that it is subject to as few difficulties as possible. I then argue that even the most defensible version of the principle is compatible with the moral permissibility of hESC research.
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页码：190 / 206
页数：17
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