Excess entry in the absence of scale economies

被引：28

作者：

Ghosh, Arghya ^{[1
]}

Saha, Souresh

机构：

[1] Univ New S Wales, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia

[2] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, Singapore 119260, Singapore

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2007年 / 30卷 / 03期

关键词：

free entry; economies of scale; business-stealing; excess entry; Cournot; Stackelberg;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-005-0072-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

It is well-known that with free entry, more firms than is socially optimal typically enter provided there are economies of scale. This paper investigates the possibility of excess entry in the absence of scale economies

引用

页码：575 / 586

页数：12

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