Strategic interaction and imitation dynamics in patch differentiated exploitation of fisheries

被引:16
作者
Bischi, Gian Italo [2 ]
Lamantia, Fabio [1 ]
Sbragia, Lucia [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calabria, Dept Business Sci, I-87036 Arcavacata Di Rende, CS, Italy
[2] Univ Urbino, Dept Econ, I-61029 Urbino, Italy
[3] Univ Durham, Durham Business Sch, Dept Econ & Finance, Durham DH1 3HY, England
关键词
Fisheries; Marine protected areas; Bioeconomic models; Oligopoly games; Imitation; Nonlinear dynamical systems; MARINE RESERVES; MANAGEMENT; EVOLUTION; RESOURCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.ecocom.2009.03.004
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
In this paper we propose a discrete-time dynamic model for studying the time evolution of fish stocks in an aquatic environment divided into two adjacent patches, one characterized by an imposed constant fishing effort and another one where fishermen are free to decide the quantity to harvest according to oligopolistic competition taking into account economic and biologic externalities. Given the total number of fishermen, we propose an evolutionary switching mechanism, based on imitation dynamics, that endogenously regulates the fraction of fishermen that, at each time period, decide to operate in one of the two regions on the basis of observed past profits. Numerical simulations provide some insights into the role of the main parameters. This model has been motivated by a project for the creation of a marine protected area (MPA) in the Adriatic sea. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:353 / 362
页数:10
相关论文
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