Efficient auctions

被引:186
作者
Dasgupta, P [1 ]
Maskin, E
机构
[1] Univ Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1TN, England
[2] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1162/003355300554755
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We exhibit an efficient auction (an auction that maximizes surplus conditional on all available information). For private values, the Vickrey auction (for one good) or its Groves-Clarke extension (for multiple goods) is efficient. We show that the Vickrey and Groves-Clarke auctions can be generalized to attain efficiency when there are common values, if each buyer's information can be represented as a one-dimensional signal. When a buyer's information is multidimensional, no auction is generally efficient. Nevertheless, in a broad class of cases, our auction is constrained-efficient in the sense of being efficient subject to incentive constraints.
引用
收藏
页码:341 / 388
页数:48
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