Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory

被引：23

作者：

Laruelle, Annick

Valenciano, Federico

机构：

[1] Univ Basque Country, Dept Econ Aplicada 4, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain

[2] Univ Alicante, Dept Fundamentos Anal Econ, E-03071 Alicante, Spain

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2007年 / 132卷 / 01期

关键词：

bargaining; voting; committees;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper addresses the following issue: if a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives `in the shadow' of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a 'winning coalition' supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: what influence can the voting rule used to settle (possibly nonunanimous) agreements have on the outcome of consensus? We model the situation as an extension of the Nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule replaces unanimity. In this setting a natural extension of Nash's solution is characterized. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：291 / 305

页数：15