The influence of political fragmentation on public enterprises: Evidence from German municipalities

被引：12

作者：

Boll, David ^{[1
]}

Sidki, Marcus ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Ludwigshafen Univ Appl Sci, Ernst Boehe Str 4, D-67059 Ludwigshafen, Germany

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2021年 / 67卷

关键词：

Municipal enterprises; Investments; Political economy; Interest fragmentation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101972

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study investigates the influence of politically fragmented municipal councils on the investment behaviour of municipally owned public enterprises. We argue that common public choice theories can also be applied to public enterprises. For our observation period (2002?2014), we use a data set encompassing 8,685 municipally owned enterprises subject to commercial accounting located in 3,237 municipalities drawn from all 13 German federal area states. On average, our results point to a negative effect of fragmentation on investment per capita, supporting a war of attrition or veto player approach. Effects are heterogeneous among different sectors, possibly due to higher visibility to voters. Thus, veto players might actively try to block prestigious and publicly perceivable investment projects to hinder their opponents. Political budget cycles additionally influence this effect for some sectors. However, testing non-linearities reveal that the commonpool hypothesis cannot be completely ruled out.

引用

页数：18

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