Institutionalized uncertainty, the rule of law, and the sources of democratic stability

The third wave of democratization has been accompanied by two innovative theoretical claims that procedural regime attributes have systematic consequences for substantive outcomes under democracy and authoritarianism. Many "rule of law" claims associate democracy with lower risks and greater predictability over outcomes than authoritarianism. The "institutionalized uncertainty" claim expects nearly the opposite pattern. Each has important implications for regime support and thus for regime (in)stability. This article argues that neither approach effectively captures global patterns of risk and predictability. A reconsideration shows that both approaches mischaracterize both regime types. Predictability is shown to vary at least as much across as between the two regime types. This is the result of factors exogenous to procedures, such as structures of political, social, and economic conflict. As a result, these structural conditions, rather than regime features alone, explain outcomes such as democratic instability and consolidation. Evidence suggests this is the case.