Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited

被引：32

作者：

Forges, Francois ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Paris 09, CEREMADE, F-75775 Paris 16, France

来源：

THEORY AND DECISION | 2006年 / 61卷 / 04期

关键词：

Bayesian rationality; correlated equilibrium; games with incomplete information;

D O I：

10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A mistake in "Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information" motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

引用

页码：329 / 344

页数：16

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