Failsafe modes in incomplete minority game

被引:0
作者
Yao, Xiaobo [1 ,2 ]
Wan, Shaolong [1 ,2 ]
Chen, Wen [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sci & Technol China, Inst Theoret Phys, Hefei 230026, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Sci & Technol China, Dept Modern Phys, Hefei 230026, Peoples R China
[3] Wuxi Inst Technol, Informat Ctr, Wuxi 214121, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Minority game; Incomplete strategy; Failsafe; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.1016/j.physa.2009.06.016
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
We make a failsafe extension to the incomplete minority game model, give a brief analysis on how incompleteness will effect system efficiency. Simulations that limited incompleteness in strategies can improve the system efficiency. Among three failsafe modes, the "Back-to-Best" mode brings most significant improvement and keeps the system efficiency in a long range of incompleteness. A simple analytic formula has a trend which matches simulation results. The IMMG model is used to study the effect of distribution, and we find that there is one junction point in each series of curves, at which system efficiency is not influenced by the distribution of incompleteness. When (p(I)) over bar > (p(I)) over bar (c) the concentration of incompleteness weakens the effect. On the other side of (p(I)) over bar (c), concentration will be helpful. When p(I) is close to zero agents using incomplete strategies have on average better profits than those using standard strategies, and the "Back-to-Best" agents have a wider range of p(I) to win. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:3892 / 3900
页数:9
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