Impacts of a new insurance benefit with capitated provider payment on healthcare utilization, expenditure and quality of medication prescribing in China

被引:11
作者
Sun, Jing [1 ]
Zhang, Xiaotian [2 ]
Zhang, Zou [3 ]
Wagner, Anita K. [4 ,5 ]
Ross-Degnan, Dennis [4 ,5 ]
Hogerzeil, Hans V. [6 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Acad Med Sci, Dept Nutr Food & Drug Safety, Peking Union Med Coll, Beijing 100730, Peoples R China
[2] Zhuhai Hlth Insurance Res Assoc, Zhuhai, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[3] Beijing Normal Univ, Dept Management, Zhuhai, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[4] Harvard Univ, Sch Med, Dept Populat Med, Boston, MA USA
[5] Harvard Pilgrim Hlth Care Inst, Boston, MA USA
[6] Univ Groningen, Univ Med Ctr Groningen, Dept Hlth Sci, Groningen, Netherlands
关键词
primary care; benefit package; provider payment; healthcare utilization; expenditure; quality of medication prescribing; PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; SYSTEM;
D O I
10.1111/tmi.12636
中图分类号
R1 [预防医学、卫生学];
学科分类号
1004 ; 120402 ;
摘要
ObjectivesTo assess a new Chinese insurance benefit with capitated provider payment for common diseases in outpatients. MethodsLongitudinal health insurance claims data, health administrative data and primary care facility data were used to assess trajectories in outpatient visits, inpatient admissions, expenditure per common disease outpatient (CD/OP) visit and prescribing indicators over time. We conducted segmented regression analyses of interrupted time series data to measure changes in level and trend overtime, and cross-sectional comparisons against external standards. ResultsThe number of total outpatient visits at 46 primary care facilities (on the CD/OP benefit as of July 2012) increased by 46 895 visits/month (P = 0.004, 95% CI: 15 795-77 994); the average number of CD/OP visits reached 1.84/year/enrollee in 2012; monthly inpatient admissions dropped from 6.4 (2009) to 4.3 (2012) per 1000 enrollees; the median total expenditure per CD/OP visit dropped by CNY 15.40 (P = 0.16, 95% CI: -36.95 similar to 6.15); injectable use dropped by 7.38% (P = 0.03, 95% CI: -14.08%similar to-0.68%); antibiotic use was not improved. ConclusionsZhuhai's new CD/OP benefit with capitated provider payment has expanded access to primary care, which may have led to a reduction in expensive specialist inpatient services for CD/OP benefit enrollees. Cost awareness was likely raised, and rapidly growing expenditures were contained. Although having been partially improved, inappropriate prescribing of antibiotics and injectables was still prevalent. More explicit incentives and specific quality of care targets must be incorporated into the capitated provider payment to promote scientifically sound and cost-effective care and treatment.
引用
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页码:263 / 274
页数:12
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