Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods

被引：4

作者：

Klaus, Bettina

Dimitrov, Dinko

Haake, Claus-Jochen

机构：

[1] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands

[2] Univ Bielefeld, Inst Math Econ, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2006年 / 93卷 / 01期

关键词：

exchange markets; indivisible goods; bundling-proofness;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.045

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents' preferences are additive, no such rule exists. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.

引用

页码：106 / 110

页数：5

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