Asymmetric rent-seeking with more than two contestants

被引：96

作者：

Stein, WE ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Texas A&M Univ, Dept Informat & Operat Management, College Stn, TX 77843 USA

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2002年 / 113卷 / 3-4期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1023/A:1020877410243

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article considers a rent-seeking model with N asymmetric contestants. Each contestant may have a different valuation of the rent or a different relative ability to win the rent. One of the N contestants is selected as the winner based on Tullock's probabilistic contest rule with constant returns to scale. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution is obtained and its consequences are investigated.

引用

页码：325 / 336

页数：12

共 11 条

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