How does quasi-indexer ownership affect corporate tax planning?

被引：86

作者：

Chen, Shuping ^{[1
]}

Huang, Ying ^{[2
]}

Li, Ningzhong ^{[2
]}

Shevlin, Terry ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA

[2] Univ Texas Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083 USA

[3] Univ Calif Irvine, Irvine, CA USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2019年 / 67卷 / 2-3期

关键词：

Tax planning; Quasi-indexer; Russell index assignment; Regression discontinuity; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; INCENTIVES; GOVERNANCE; AVOIDANCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.01.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study whether, and more importantly, through what mechanisms, quasi-indexers affect portfolio firms' tax planning by employing the discontinuity in quasi-indexer ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 index cutoff. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that higher quasi-indexer ownership leads to greater tax saving. With respect to the mechanisms, we find that the greater tax saving is a result of a focus on improved overall firm performance, not a specific focus on improved tax planning. We further find that the documented tax saving effect is partially due to quasi-indexers' influences on executive equity incentives, corporate governance, and information environment.

引用

页码：278 / 296

页数：19

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