The stable admissions polytope

被引：39

作者：

Baïou, M ^{[1
]}

Balinski, M

机构：

[1] Ecole Polytech, Lab Economet, F-75230 Paris, France

[2] Univ Chile, Dept Ingn Mat, Santiago, Chile

[3] CNRS, Paris, France

来源：

MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING | 2000年 / 87卷 / 03期

关键词：

stable assignment; stable marriage; two-sided market; polytopes; graphs; many-to-one matching;

D O I：

10.1007/s101070050004

中图分类号：

TP31 [计算机软件];

学科分类号：

081202 ; 0835 ;

摘要：

The stable admissions polytope - the convex hull of the stable assignments of the university admissions problem - is described by a set of linear inequalities. It depends on a new characterization of stability and arguments that exploit and extend a graphical approach that has been fruitful in the analysis of the stable marriage problem.

引用

页码：427 / 439

页数：13

共 10 条

[1]

BAIOU M, 2000, IN PRESS DISCRETE AP

[2]

BAIOU M, 1998, ADMISSIONS VIA GRAPH

[3] Graphs and marriages [J].