Social networks and occupational choice: The endogenous formation of attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance

被引:35
作者
Hashimzade, Nigar [1 ]
Myles, Gareth D. [2 ,3 ]
Page, Frank [4 ]
Rablen, Matthew D. [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Reading, Reading RG66AH, Berks, England
[2] Univ Exeter, Exeter EX44PU, Devon, England
[3] Inst Fiscal Studies, London WC1E 7AE, England
[4] Indiana Univ, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
[5] Brunel Univ, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, Middx, England
关键词
Tax evasion; Attitudes; Beliefs; Endogeneity; Social network; Agent-based modelling; Bomb-crater effect; PROSPECT-THEORY; EVASION; MODEL; TAXATION; ECONOMICS; EVOLUTION; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.joep.2012.09.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper analyses the emergence of group-specific attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance when individuals interact in a social network. It develops a model in which taxpayers possess a range of individual characteristics including attitude to risk, potential for success in self-employment, and the weight attached to the social custom for honesty and make an occupational choice based on these characteristics. Occupations differ in the possibility for evading tax. The social network determines which taxpayers are linked, and information about auditing and compliance is transmitted at meetings between linked taxpayers. Using agent-based simulations, the analysis demonstrates how attitudes and beliefs endogenously emerge that differ across sub-groups of the population. Compliance behaviour is different across occupational groups, and this is reinforced by the development of group-specific attitudes and beliefs. Taxpayers self-select into occupations according to the degree of risk aversion, the subjective probability of audit is sustained above the objective probability, and the weight attached to the social custom differs across occupations. These factors combine to lead to compliance levels that differ across occupations. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:134 / 146
页数:13
相关论文
共 65 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], 0052009 CAEPR
  • [2] [Anonymous], 272001 ICER
  • [3] [Anonymous], MEASURING TAX GAPS 2
  • [4] [Anonymous], 2009, Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks
  • [5] [Anonymous], NETWORKS TAXPAYER NO
  • [6] [Anonymous], ICFAI J PUBLIC FINAN
  • [7] [Anonymous], J PUBLIC EC THEORY
  • [8] Tax compliance and rank dependent expected utility
    Arcand, JL
    Graziosi, GR
    [J]. GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW, 2005, 30 (01) : 57 - 69
  • [9] The role of occupational taxpaying cultures in taxpaying behaviour and attitudes
    Ashby, Julie S.
    Webley, Paul
    Haslam, S. Alexander
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 2009, 30 (02) : 216 - 227
  • [10] TAX EVASION IS NOT A GAMBLE - A REPORT ON 2 EXPERIMENTS
    BALDRY, JC
    [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1986, 22 (04) : 333 - 335