How patent signals affect venture capital: The evidence of bio-pharmaceutical start-ups in China

被引:38
作者
Zhang, Lili [1 ]
Guo, Ying [2 ]
Sun, Ganlu [3 ]
机构
[1] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Publ Policy & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
[2] Beijing Inst Technol, Sch Management & Econ, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[3] Aisino Corp, Beijing 100195, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Patent; Venture capital (VC); Signaling; Blo-pharmaceutical industry; IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS; PERFORMANCE; TECHNOLOGY; MOTIVES; FUNDS;
D O I
10.1016/j.techfore.2019.05.013
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Innovation is the key to the economic development, and enterprises are the foundation of innovation. Bridging both these elements is the venture capital, who often rely on patents as one way to assess the potential of a start-up. Patents have the power to send signals about a start-up's capabilities, future prospects, and their right to produce and profit from specific innovations. To understand the influence these signals have on the amount of venture capital funding a start-up receives, we analyzed the three main types of signals a patent can send technological, commercial, and legal along with other "noise" factors that may affect a signal's transmission. Each of the hypotheses put forward examine how the various attributes of a patent or a start-up act as signals to venture capitalists, and one regression model were constructed as tests. Using the bio-pharmaceutical industry in China as a subject, the results of this empirical research show that legal signals have the greatest influence over venture capital funding levels, closely followed by technological signals. Commercial signals have less impact. Further, invention patents, particularly public invention patents, have a significant impact on venture capital decisions. This research has a significant meaning to start-up as venture capitalist, who can choose a right way to transmit or decode the patent signal in venture capital.
引用
收藏
页码:93 / 104
页数:12
相关论文
共 40 条
[1]   Engaging the inventor: Exploring licensing strategies for university inventions and the role of latent knowledge [J].
Agrawal, A .
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 2006, 27 (01) :63-79
[2]  
[Anonymous], J BUS VENTUR
[3]   Picking winners or building them? Alliance, intellectual, and human capital as selection criteria in venture financing and performance of biotechnology startups [J].
Baum, JAC ;
Silverman, BS .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING, 2004, 19 (03) :411-436
[4]   Corporate Venture Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation [J].
Chemmanur, Thomas J. ;
Loutskina, Elena ;
Tian, Xuan .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2014, 27 (08) :2434-2473
[5]  
Conti A, 2013, J ECON MANAGE STRAT, V22, P24
[6]  
Dang X, 2011, NANKAI BUS REV NT, V14, P82
[7]   Patent applications and subsequent changes of performance: evidence from time-series cross-section analyses on the firm level [J].
Ernst, H .
RESEARCH POLICY, 2001, 30 (01) :143-157
[8]   The value of European patents [J].
Gambardella, Alfonso ;
Harhoff, Dietmar ;
Verspagen, Bart .
EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 2008, 5 (02) :69-84
[9]  
Gayle PhilipG., 2001, Market concentration and innovation: New empirical evidence on the schumpeterian hypothesis
[10]   OPTIMAL INVESTMENT, MONITORING, AND THE STAGING OF VENTURE CAPITAL [J].
GOMPERS, PA .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1995, 50 (05) :1461-1489