The relationship between relative performance and managerial change

被引:5
作者
Salehi, Mahdi [1 ]
Mirozadeh, Masomeh [2 ]
Adibian, Mohammad Sadegh [1 ]
Nazaridavaji, Hamideh [1 ]
Sorkh, Fahimeh Irvani Qale [3 ]
机构
[1] Ferdowsi Univ Mashhad, Dept Econ & Adm Sci, Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan, Iran
[2] Attar Inst Higher Educ, Dept Econ & Adm Sci, Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan, Iran
[3] Islamic Azad Univ, Dept Econ & Adm Sci, Neyshabur Branch, Neyshabur, Iran
关键词
Systematic risk; CEO change; Relative performance evaluation; Unsystematic risk; CEO TURNOVER; GROWTH; TENURE;
D O I
10.1108/JFM-08-2020-0049
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Purpose The current study aims to investigate the relationship between relative performance and change manager in Iran. Design/methodology/approach For this study, the reasons for CEO change and the contributing factors to performance were defined based on the industry type. A systematic elimination approach is applied to select the study sample among listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2012-2016. Finally, a 390 firm-year population was tested using multiple regression. Findings The results of hypothesis testing indicate that the possibility of managerial change is less likely after a positive return of the market performance. Moreover, hypothesis testing results reveal that peer firms and specific-firm performance do not contribute to managerial change. The findings also demonstrate that systematic risk has a negative impact on managerial change, whereas unsystematic risks do not significantly play a part in managerial change. Originality/value As the present study is the pioneer study on the impact of managerial change factors on Iranian firms' relative performance, the findings of this study can contribute to the realm of this study and the related literature.
引用
收藏
页码:80 / 91
页数:12
相关论文
共 28 条
  • [1] Corporate governance, ownership structure and performance of SMEs in Ghana: implications for financing opportunities
    Abor, Joshua
    Biekpe, Nicholas
    [J]. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS IN SOCIETY, 2007, 7 (03): : 288 - +
  • [2] Do Growth-Option Firms Use Less Relative Performance Evaluation?
    Albuquerque, Ana Maria
    [J]. ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2014, 89 (01) : 27 - 60
  • [3] CEO tenure and earnings management
    Ali, Ashiq
    Zhang, Weining
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2015, 59 (01) : 60 - 79
  • [4] Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover
    Anderson, Ronald W.
    Bustamante, M. Cecilia
    Guibaud, Stephane
    Zervos, Mihail
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2018, 73 (01) : 419 - 464
  • [5] Bloomfield M.J., 2020, SABOTAGE COLLUSION, DOI DOI 10.2139/SSRN.3524522
  • [6] Risk and CEO turnover
    Bushman, Robert
    Dai, Zhonglan
    Wang, Xue
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2010, 96 (03) : 381 - 398
  • [7] Have individual stocks become more volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk
    Campbell, JY
    Lettau, M
    Malkiel, BG
    Xu, YX
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2001, 56 (01) : 1 - 43
  • [8] Chen Dong, 2014, Global Business and Finance Review, V19, P1, DOI 10.17549/gbfr.2014.19.1.01
  • [9] OPTIMAL MANAGERIAL CONTRACTS AND EQUILIBRIUM SECURITY PRICES
    DIAMOND, DW
    VERRECCHIA, RE
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1982, 37 (02) : 275 - 287
  • [10] The Value-Relevance of Changes in Financial Leverage Beyond Growth in Assets and GAAP Earnings
    Dimitrov, Valentin
    Jain, Prem
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AUDITING AND FINANCE, 2008, 23 (02) : 191 - 222