Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement

被引：10

作者：

Ensthaler, Ludwig ^{[1
]}

Giebe, Thomas ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England

[2] TU Berlin, D-10623 Berlin, Germany

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH | 2014年 / 234卷 / 03期

关键词：

Game theory; Mechanism design; Knapsack problem; Subsidies; Budget; Procurement; MECHANISM DESIGN;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.031

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer's objective function, but only his constraints. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. We report the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the buyer's problem. We find that simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers are interim optimal. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：774 / 779

页数：6

共 30 条

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