Rivalry between airport ancillary and city-center supplies

被引：6

作者：

Czerny, Achim, I ^{[1
]}

Zhang, Hanxiang ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Logist & Maritime Studies, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Li Ka Shing Tower, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW | 2020年 / 141卷

关键词：

Airport privatization; City-center rivalry; Ancillary goods; Myopic passengers; Foresighted passengers; CONCESSION REVENUES; MARKET POWER; SINGLE-TILL; CONGESTION; CAPACITY; MODEL; ADD; ECONOMICS; IMPACT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.tre.2020.101987

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Passengers can buy souvenirs or rent a car at the airport or in the city-center. This paper develops a basic model with unit demands for airport ancillary and city-center demands to derive equilibrium pricing strategies of profit-maximizing airports and city-center companies and evaluates them from the social viewpoint. Passengers are myopic in the sense that only ticket prices matter for flight decisions or foresighted in the sense that non-aeronautical airport and city-center supplies matter for flight decisions, too. We find that the welfare evaluation of equilibrium airport pricing behavior can be independent of whether passengers are myopic or foresighted.

引用

页数：17