Information acquisition and efficient mechanism design

被引:154
作者
Bergemann, D [1 ]
Välimäki, J
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[2] Univ Southampton, Dept Econ, Southampton SO17 1BJ, Hants, England
关键词
auctions; mechanism design; information acquisition; ex-ante and ex-post efficiency;
D O I
10.1111/1468-0262.00317
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex-post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism guarantees both ex-ante as well as ex-post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex-ante and ex-post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub- and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex-post efficient mechanisms lead to private under- or over-acquisition of information.
引用
收藏
页码:1007 / 1033
页数:27
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