DO THE BETTER INSURED CAUSE MORE DAMAGE? TESTING FOR ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CAR INSURANCE

被引:10
作者
Zavadil, Tibor [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Bank Slovakia, Res Dept, Bratislava 81325, Slovakia
关键词
ADVERSE SELECTION; MORAL HAZARD; AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE; ADVANTAGEOUS SELECTION; TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS; MARKETS; ECONOMICS; EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I
10.1111/jori.12040
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article tests for the presence of asymmetric information in Dutch car insurance among senior drivers using several nonparametric tests based on conditional-correlation approach. Since asymmetric information implies that more comprehensive coverage is associated with higher risk, we examine whether the better insured have a higher frequency of claims or cause more severe accidents. Using data on claim occurrences, incurred losses and written premiums, and controlling for the insureds' experience rating, we do not find any evidence of asymmetric information in this market.
引用
收藏
页码:865 / 889
页数:25
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