The applicability of non-cooperative game theory in transport analysis

被引:108
作者
Hollander, Yaron
Prashker, Joseph N.
机构
[1] Univ Leeds, Inst Transport Studies, Leeds LS2 9JT, W Yorkshire, England
[2] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Civil & Environm Engn, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
关键词
behavioural models; mathematical models; transport models; transport policy; non-cooperative game theory;
D O I
10.1007/s11116-006-0009-1
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
Various models that incorporate concepts from Non-Cooperative Game Theory (NCGT) are described in the transport literature. Game Theory provides powerful tools for analysing transport systems, but these tools have some drawbacks that should be recognised. In the current paper we review games that describe transport problems and discuss them within a uniform context. Although the paper does not introduce new tools, it presents insights concerning the relations between transport models and games. We divide existing games into groups and show that some common features characterise multiple games. We distinguish between games that make a conceptual contribution and games that are suitable for application. Compact or symmetric game structures make remarkable observations but often do not support actual decision-making. Less aesthetic formats, most of which are Stackelberg games between authorities and travellers, are stronger as instruments that assist in determining real-life policies; these formulations can be treated by practitioners as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints and not as games.
引用
收藏
页码:481 / 496
页数:16
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