Judge: Don't Vote!

被引：29

作者：

Balinski, Michel ^{[1
]}

Laraki, Rida ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Ecole Polytech, CNRS, Lab Econometrie, F-91128 Palaiseau, France

[2] Univ Paris 09, CNRS, Lab Anal & Modelisat Syst Aide DEcis, F-75775 Paris 16, France

[3] Ecole Polytech, Dept Econ, F-91128 Palaiseau, France

来源：

OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2014年 / 62卷 / 03期

关键词：

STRATEGY-PROOFNESS; MAJORITY JUDGMENT; ARROWS CONDITIONS; EQUITY;

D O I：

10.1287/opre.2014.1269

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing-majority judgment-that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting.

引用

页码：483 / 511

页数：29