Moral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations

被引:30
作者
Delton, Andrew W. [1 ]
DeScioli, Peter [1 ]
Ryan, Timothy J. [2 ]
机构
[1] SUNY Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794 USA
[2] Univ N Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27515 USA
关键词
attitude strength; bargaining; experimental political science; moral conviction; moral psychology; negotiation; ultimatum game; ATTITUDE STRENGTH; FOUNDATIONS; CONVICTION; CONSEQUENCES; PREFERENCES; IDEOLOGY; FAIRNESS; LIBERALS;
D O I
10.1111/pops.12612
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Research in behavioral economics finds that moral considerations bear on the offers that people make and accept in negotiations. This finding is relevant for political negotiations, wherein moral concerns are manifold. However, behavioral economics has yet to incorporate a major theme from moral psychology: People differ, sometimes immensely, in which issues they perceive to be a matter of morality. We review research about the measurement and characteristics of moral convictions. We hypothesize that moral conviction leads to uncompromising bargaining strategies and failed negotiations. We test this theory in three incentivized experiments in which participants bargain over political policies with real payoffs at stake. We find that participants' moral convictions are linked with aggressive bargaining strategies, which helps explain why it is harder to forge bargains on some political issues than others. We also find substantial asymmetries between liberals and conservatives in the intensity of their moral convictions about different issues.
引用
收藏
页码:3 / 20
页数:18
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