Study on Supervision Mechanism of Financing Platform Based on Evolutionary Game

被引：0

作者：

Wu Yingjing ^{[1
]}

Wang Yufan ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Hulunbuir Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Hulunbuir 021008, Peoples R China

[2] SUNY Binghamton, Binghamton, NY USA

来源：

2019 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SERVICE SYSTEMS AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT (ICSSSM2019) | 2019年

关键词：

evolutionary game; financing platform; regulatory mechanism introduction;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

With the frequent occurrence of financing platform problems, the supervision of financing platform is imminent. This paper chooses the evolutionary game method and considers the game model composed of government and financing platform. The research finds that the decision-making of government and financing platform affects each other, but it is difficult to control the risk of platform only depending on the constraints of platform itself. To some extent, the government's supervision of the platform can reduce the risks caused by platform auditing.This electronic document is a "live" template and already defines the components of your paper [title, text, heads, etc.] in its style sheet.

引用

页数：5