CEO-director ties and labor investment efficiency

被引：159

作者：

Khedmati, Mehdi ^{[1
]}

Sualihu, Mohammed Aminu ^{[1
]}

Yawson, Alfred ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Monash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Level 10,Menzies Bldg,Clayton Campus, Clayton, Vic 3800, Australia

[2] Univ Adelaide, Business Sch, 10 Pulteney St, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2020年 / 65卷

关键词：

Labor; Investment; Monitoring; CEOs; Directors; FINANCIAL-REPORTING QUALITY; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; BOARD CONNECTIONS; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; STOCK-PRICE; SOCIAL TIES; COSTS; NETWORKS; EARNINGS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101492

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine the impact of CEO-director ties on labor investment efficiency. Using an aggregate measure of CEO-director ties we find that CEOs who have strong ties with independent board members are associated with inefficient labor investment. The effect is stronger in firms that rely more on skilled labor and those that are financially constrained, and that inefficient labor investment exacerbates labor cost stickiness. Our results are robust to selection bias, endogeneity concerns, and alternative explanations. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that stronger CEO ties to independent board members makes monitoring ineffective, which, in turn, aggravates the inefficient labor investment problem. Thus, we identify a potential channel through which CEO-director ties can be detrimental to shareholder value.

引用

页数：24

共 87 条

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