A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems

被引：10

作者：

Albizuri, M. J. ^{[1
]}

Echarri, J. M. ^{[1
]}

Zarzuelo, J. M. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Fac Econ & Business Adm, Bilbao 48015, Spain

来源：

ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2015年 / 235卷 / 01期

关键词：

Cost allocation; Airport problem; Non-cooperative mechanism; Nash program; Cooperative games; Shapley value; SHARING PROBLEMS; GAME; NUCLEOLUS; SURPLUS; TALMUD; RULES;

D O I：

10.1007/s10479-015-1981-7

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

In this paper we address the question of how to allocate the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users based on a non-cooperative approach. We present a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique Nash equilibrium outcome whose payoffs are the Shapley value of an airport problem. Furthermore, it is shown that all strategy profiles leading to a subgame perfect equilibrium in these games are also coalition-proof.

引用

页码：1 / 11

页数：11

共 21 条

[1] Updating claims in bankruptcy problems [J].