Universal possibility and impossibility results

被引:20
作者
Schweizer, Urs [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
关键词
impossibility theorems; efficient mechanisms; private information; participation constraints;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.015
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a setting of private information, the possibility (impossibility) theorem is said to be valid if a balanced mechanism exists (does not exist) which is ex post efficient and satisfies interim individual rationality. If this validity depends on the support only but not the prior distribution of information itself the universal possibility or impossibility theorem is said to hold. The present paper explores the scope of universal possibility and impossibility theorems for an exogenously given outside option as well as for situations where the outside option is a matter of design. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:73 / 85
页数:13
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