Sellars and the 'myth of the given'

Sellars is well known for his critique of the 'myth of the given' in his 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. That text does not make it unambiguous just how he understands the 'myth'. Here I take it that whatever else may be involved, his critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of 'presentation' or 'givenness' of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of cognition. A critical examination of Sellars' arguments, particularly those directed at the Theory of Appearing, results in the conclusion that he has failed to eliminate the above view of perception. Moreover, though Sellars is clearly opposed to the view that perceptual experience cannot provide justification for beliefs about perceived objects, I argue that Sellars has failed to shake the intuitive plausibility of that view.