Promotions, Turnover, and Performance Evaluation: Evidence from the Careers of Division Managers

被引：45

作者：

Cichello, Michael S. ^{[1
]}

Fee, C. Edward ^{[2
]}

Hadlock, Charles J. ^{[2
]}

Sonti, Ramana ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Penn, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[2] Michigan State Univ, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA

[3] Indian Sch Business, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India

来源：

ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2009年 / 84卷 / 04期

关键词：

turnover; promotions; internal labor markets; performance measurement; division managers; INTERACTION TERMS; MORAL HAZARD; COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES; MARKET; INFORMATION; IMPACT; LOGIT; RISK; FIRM;

D O I：

10.2308/accr.2009.84.4.1119

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study turnover and promotions of division managers in multidivisional firms. Turnover is negatively related to divisional accounting performance, positively related to industry performance, but not significantly related to firm performance or the performance of other divisions. Consistent with tournament theory, promotions are significantly related to whether one division is performing better than others, but are not significantly related to the magnitude of any performance difference. A simple performance metric, divisional ROA, appears more closely related to job allocation decisions than several alternatives. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that accounting information is used by firms when evaluating managerial personnel.

引用

页码：1119 / 1143

页数：25

共 43 条

[1] The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation [J].