A DEFENCE OF THE EXPLANATORY ARGUMENT FOR PHYSICALISM

被引：6

作者：

Bates, Jared ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Hanover Coll, Indiana, PA USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2009年 / 59卷 / 235期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.593.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.

引用

页码：315 / 324

页数：10

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