Ethical Intuitionism and the Emotions: Toward an Empirically Adequate Moral Sense Theory

被引：2

作者：

Sias, James ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Dickinson Coll, Carlisle, PA 17013 USA

来源：

关键词：

Emotional Response; Moral Judgment; Perceptual Experience; Moral Belief; Moral Character;

D O I：

10.1007/s10790-014-9427-z

中图分类号：

B82 [伦理学（道德学）];

学科分类号：

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：533 / 549

页数：17

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