The Pandora's box objection to skeptical theism

被引：8

作者：

Law, Stephen ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ London, Heythrop Coll, London W8 5HN, England

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION | 2015年 / 78卷 / 03期

关键词：

Skeptical theism; Bergmann; Defeat; Skepticism; ARGUMENTS;

D O I：

10.1007/s11153-015-9526-1

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Skeptical theism is a leading response to the evidential argument from evil against the existence of God. Skeptical theists attempt to block the inference from the existence of inscrutable evils (evil for which we can think of no God-justifying reason) to gratuitous evils (evils for which there is no God justifying reason) by insisting that given our cognitive limitations, it wouldn't be surprising if there were God-justifying reasons we can't think of. A well-known objection to skeptical theism is that it opens up a skeptical Pandora's box, generating implausibly wide-ranging forms of skepticism, including skepticism about the external world and past. This paper looks at several responses to this Pandora's box objection, including a popular response devised by Beaudoin and Bergmann. I find that all of the examined responses fail. It appears the Pandora's box objection to skeptical theism still stands.

引用

页码：285 / 299

页数：15

共 23 条

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