Self-knowledge, rationality and Moore's paradox

被引:12
作者
Fernandez, Jordi [1 ]
机构
[1] Macquarie Univ, N Ryde, NSW, Australia
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00470.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore's paradox. Moore's paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one's own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one's own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis.
引用
收藏
页码:533 / 556
页数:24
相关论文
共 14 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1980, REMARKS PHILOS PSYCH
[2]  
[Anonymous], PHILOS PERSPECTIVES
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1999, Nous, 33, Supplement, V13, P29
[4]   Shoemaker on second-order belief (Critique of Sydney Shoemaker's epistemological argument) [J].
Brueckner, A .
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, 1998, 58 (02) :361-364
[5]  
Evans Gareth., 1982, The Varieties of Reference
[6]   Privileged access naturalized [J].
Fernández, J .
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 2003, 53 (212) :352-372
[7]  
Goldman Alvin I., 1979, Justification and Knowledge. Ed. by, P1
[8]   MOORE PARADOX - A WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH [J].
HEAL, J .
MIND, 1994, 103 (409) :5-24
[9]   Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief [J].
Kriegel, U .
ERKENNTNIS, 2004, 61 (01) :99-121
[10]   MOORE PARADOX REVISITED [J].
LINVILLE, K ;
RING, M .
SYNTHESE, 1991, 87 (02) :295-309