Party, Electoral Vulnerability, and Earmarks in the US House of Representatives

Very little attention has been paid to the relationship between House members' electoral vulnerability and the amount of federal spending they procure for their districts. I argue that vulnerable members receive more spending than safe members, on average, but only if they are in the majority party. Party leaders, as part of maintaining or pursuing a majority, have an interest in protecting their party's most vulnerable members. However, the majority party has a greater degree of control over spending than the minority party. This implies that the majority leadership is able to "protect" projects which are electorally beneficial to their party's vulnerable members, but the minority leadership is not. As a result, there is a positive relationship between vulnerability and the amount of pork procured among majority members, but not among minority members. Examinations of three different datasets centering on earmark distribution in the U.S. House from the past 15 years confirm these hypotheses.