The hidden meanings in the case law of the European Court for Human Rights

In my paper, I will study the case law of the European Court of Human Rights by using discourse analysis as a method. My hypothesis is that the court has changed its line concerning the right to a fair trial (in article 6 of the European Convention for Human Rights) over the last twenty years. Earlier, it always defended the rights of the accused and the authorities' problems, for instance, in fact gathering, were recessive. The same covered the rights of the witnesses even if the court usually confessed that also the witness has their rights, which should be respected. It also stressed that authorities of course have difficulties with proof - for example - the offences that are connected with the organized crime. Still, the rights of defense were always number one and inviolate. During recent years, the line seems to have changed even if the court has not transparently said so. However, it has given some new precedents by the Grand Chamber where the rights of the defense have been limited more than before; for instance, the cases Jalloh v. Germany (11 July 2006), Gafgen v. Germany (1 June 2010), and Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. Great Britain (15 December 2011). The expressions used in case law show that the way of thinking has changed as well. Still, the changes are sometimes more hidden than transparent where discourse analysis is the only tool for catching the changes and showing differences in the thinking of the court.