Industry Competition, Corporate Governance, and Voluntary Disclosure of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Information: Evidence from South Korea

被引:3
作者
Lee, Hyunah [1 ]
Lee, Jaehong [2 ]
机构
[1] Gachon Univ, Sch Business, Seongnam 13120, South Korea
[2] Kyonggi Univ, Div Business Adm, Major Accounting Taxat, Suwon 16227, South Korea
关键词
industry competition; corporate governance; greenhouse gas emissions information; PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION; DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION; COST; FIRM; ASSOCIATION; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.3390/ijerph192316272
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
This study investigates the relationship between industry competition and managers' voluntary disclosure policies and examined how the corporate governance structure affects this relationship in South Korean companies. The fiercer the competition within the industry to which the company belongs, the higher the incentive for managers to perform strategic actions to improve their competition status. This increase in the strategic incentives of managers can be seen through voluntary disclosure policies. The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, it was found that there was a negative relationship between the degree of industry competition and the level of voluntary disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions information. This means that managers perform less disclosure to maximize the value of the company because the more competition within the industry intensifies, the higher the proprietary cost of disclosing information on greenhouse gas emissions information. Second, it was found that the corporate governance structure weakened the relationship between the degree of industry competition and the level of corporate voluntary disclosure. These results can be interpreted as that a good governance structure supports such managers' disclosure decisions because managers are more likely to choose disclosure policies to maximize the value of the company than personal benefits even in the fierce industry competition.
引用
收藏
页数:15
相关论文
共 41 条
[1]   Industry concentration and corporate disclosure policy [J].
Ali, Ashiq ;
Klasa, Sandy ;
Yeung, Eric .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2014, 58 (2-3) :240-264
[2]   DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION AND THE SMALL FIRM EFFECT [J].
BARRY, CB ;
BROWN, SJ .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1984, 13 (02) :283-294
[3]   DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION AND SECURITY MARKET EQUILIBRIUM [J].
BARRY, CB ;
BROWN, SJ .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1985, 20 (04) :407-422
[4]   The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature [J].
Beyer, Anne ;
Cohen, Daniel A. ;
Lys, Thomas Z. ;
Walther, Beverly R. .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2010, 50 (2-3) :296-343
[5]   Managers' motives to withhold segment disclosures and the effect of SFAS no. 131 on analysts' information environment [J].
Botosan, CA ;
Stanford, M .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2005, 80 (03) :751-771
[6]  
Botosan CA, 1997, ACCOUNT REV, V72, P323
[7]   Decentralization of the firm: theory and evidence [J].
Christie, AA ;
Joye, MP ;
Watts, RL .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2003, 9 (01) :3-36
[8]   The effect of competition on CEO turnover [J].
DeFond, ML ;
Park, CW .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1999, 27 (01) :35-56
[9]   Product market competition and conditional conservatism [J].
Dhaliwal, Dan ;
Huang, Shawn ;
Khurana, Inder K. ;
Pereira, Raynolde .
REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES, 2014, 19 (04) :1309-1345
[10]   DISCLOSURE, LIQUIDITY, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL [J].
DIAMOND, DW ;
VERRECCHIA, RE .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1991, 46 (04) :1325-1359