Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation

被引：11

作者：

Gao, Shiping ^{[1
]}

Wu, Te ^{[1
]}

Nie, Suli ^{[1
]}

Wang, Long ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Xidian Univ, Ctr Complex Syst, Xian 710071, Peoples R China

[2] Peking Univ, Coll Engn, Ctr Syst & Control, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY | 2015年 / 386卷

关键词：

Evolutionary games; Cooperation; Punishment; PUBLIC-GOODS GAMES; ANTISOCIAL PUNISHMENT; COSTLY PUNISHMENT; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; MULTILEVEL SELECTION; 2ND-ORDER PUNISHMENT; FINITE POPULATIONS; SOCIAL NORMS; EVOLUTION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.009

中图分类号：

Q [生物科学];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

Investigation of anti-social punishment has shaken the positive role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation. However, punishment is ubiquitous in nature, and the centralized, apposed to decentralized, punishment is more favored by certain modern societies in particular. To explore the underlying principle of such phenomenon, we study the evolution of cooperation in the context of pro- and anti-social punishments subject to two distinct patterns: costly centralized and decentralized punishments. The results suggest that the pattern of punishment has a great effect on the role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation. In the absence of anti-social punishment, the costly centralized punishment is more effective in promoting the emergence of cooperation. Anti-social punishment can subvert the positive role of punishment when anti- and pro-social punishments are in the same pattern. However, driven by centralized pro-social punishment, cooperation can be more advantageous than defection even in the presence of decentralized anti-social punishment. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：69 / 77

页数：9

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