The lattice of envy-free matchings

被引：29
作者：
Wu, Qingyun [1 ]
Roth, Alvin E. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Management Sci & Engn, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2018年 / 109卷
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
Matching; Envy-free; Lattice; Vacancy chain; COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; STABLE MARRIAGES; SCHOOL CHOICE; STABILITY; PROPERTY; MARKETS; EXISTENCE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.016
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In a many-to-one matching model, we show that the set of envy-free matchings is a lattice. A Tarski operator on this lattice, which can be interpreted as modeling vacancy chains, has the set of stable matchings as its fixed points. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：201 / 211
页数：11
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