The lattice of envy-free matchings

被引:29
|
作者
Wu, Qingyun [1 ]
Roth, Alvin E. [2 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Management Sci & Engn, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Matching; Envy-free; Lattice; Vacancy chain; COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; STABLE MARRIAGES; SCHOOL CHOICE; STABILITY; PROPERTY; MARKETS; EXISTENCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.016
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a many-to-one matching model, we show that the set of envy-free matchings is a lattice. A Tarski operator on this lattice, which can be interpreted as modeling vacancy chains, has the set of stable matchings as its fixed points. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:201 / 211
页数:11
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