Self-managed working time and employee effort: Theory and evidence

被引:34
作者
Beckmann, Michael [1 ]
Cornelissen, Thomas [2 ]
Kraekel, Matthias [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Basel, Fac Business & Econ, Dept Human Resources & Org, Peter Merian Weg 6, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland
[2] Univ York, Dept Econ & Related Studies, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England
[3] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, Inst Appl Microecon IAME, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
关键词
Self-managed working time; Worker autonomy; Employee effort; Reciprocity; Intrinsic motivation; Complementarity; INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; WORKTIME CONTROL; MOTIVATION; BEHAVIOR; PRODUCTIVITY; GERMANY; HEALTH; PROVISION; EXCHANGE; OUTCOMES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.013
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper theoretically and empirically examines the impact of self-managed working time (SMWT) on employee effort. As a policy of increased worker autonomy, SMWT can theoretically increase effort via intrinsic motivation and reciprocal behaviour, but it can also lead to a decrease of effort due to a loss of control. Based on German individual-level panel data, we find that SMWT employees exert higher effort levels than employees with fixed working hours. Even after accounting for observed and unobserved characteristics there remains a modest positive effect. This effect is largely driven by employees who are intrinsically motivated, suggesting that intrinsic motivation is complementary to SMWT. However, reciprocal work intensification does not seem to be an important channel of providing extra effort. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:285 / 302
页数:18
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