Dictionary Attacks against Password-Based Authenticated Three-Party Key Exchange Protocols

被引:10
|
作者
Nam, Junghyun [1 ]
Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond [2 ]
Kim, Moonseong [3 ]
Paik, Juryon [4 ]
Won, Dongho [4 ]
机构
[1] Konkuk Univ, Dept Comp Engn, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Univ S Australia, Adv Comp Res Ctr, Informat Assurance Res Grp, Adelaide, SA 5001, Australia
[3] Korean Intellectual Property Off, Informat & Commun Examinat Bur, Taejon, South Korea
[4] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Dept Comp Engn, Seoul, South Korea
来源
KSII TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS | 2013年 / 7卷 / 12期
基金
新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词
Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE); three-party key exchange; password security; offline dictionary attack; undetectable online dictionary attack; SECURITY; CRYPTANALYSIS; PROOFS;
D O I
10.3837/tiis.2013.12.016
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
A three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol allows two clients registered with a trusted server to generate a common cryptographic key from their individual passwords shared only with the server. A key requirement for three-party PAKE protocols is to prevent an adversary from mounting a dictionary attack. This requirement must be met even when the adversary is a malicious (registered) client who can set up normal protocol sessions with other clients. This work revisits three existing three-party PAKE protocols, namely, Guo et al.'s (2008) protocol, Huang's (2009) protocol, and Lee and Hwang's (2010) protocol, and demonstrates that these protocols are not secure against offline and/or (undetectable) online dictionary attacks in the presence of a malicious client. The offline dictionary attack we present against Guo et al.'s protocol also applies to other similar protocols including Lee and Hwang's protocol. We conclude with some suggestions on how to design a three-party PAKE protocol that is resistant against dictionary attacks
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页码:3244 / 3260
页数:17
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