The effect of school district and municipal government financial health information on local tax election outcomes: evidence from fiscal stress labels in Ohio

被引:12
作者
Thompson, Paul N. [1 ]
Whitley, Joseph [2 ]
机构
[1] Oregon State Univ, Sch Publ Policy, Dept Econ, 340 Bexell Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331 USA
[2] Washington State Hlth Care Author, Forecasting & Financial Analyt Sect, Financial Serv Div, 626 8th Ave SE, Olympia, WA 98501 USA
关键词
Fiscal stress; Taxes; Elections; Voting; MEDIAN VOTER; REPORT CARDS; BOND REFERENDA; EDUCATION; CHOICE; POLITICS; BEHAVIOR; FLORIDA; DEMAND;
D O I
10.1007/s11127-016-0395-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A key informational asymmetry in local public finance is the lack of information available to local residents regarding the financial status of the school districts and local governments in which they reside. Given that voters in many states must approve property and income tax increases for these local entities, the lack of full information on the financial status of these local entities may lead to sub-optimal voting decisions. State financial intervention systems have begun to make financial problems more salient to residents, potentially alleviating these informational asymmetries. This paper examines the effect of the Ohio fiscal stress labeling program on voting outcomes and the tax-setting behavior of local officials for school district and municipal government tax referendums. We use a difference-in-differences approach to examine data from over 3000 school district and 2300 municipality property tax elections from 2004 to 2012. While we find minimal evidence that the yes vote share changed for school district referendums following fiscal stress label receipt, we find very large increases (15 to 23 percentage points) in the likelihood of referendum passage for school districts following label receipt. We do not find much evidence of changes in the likelihood of passage or the yes vote share following label receipt for municipalities, but we do find that these voting outcomes rise following label removal. We also find that local officials do not appreciably change their tax-setting behavior in response to these labels, as the size and likelihood of property tax proposal are largely unchanged following label receipt or removal.
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页码:265 / 288
页数:24
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