Politeness and reputation in cultural evolution

被引:2
作者
Muhlenbernd, Roland [1 ,2 ]
Wacewicz, Slawomir [1 ]
Zywiczynski, Przemyslaw [1 ]
机构
[1] Nicolaus Copernicus Univ, Ul W Bojarskiego 1, PL-87100 Torun, Poland
[2] Leibniz Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissensch, Berlin, Germany
关键词
Politeness; Reputation; Cultural evolution; Responsibility exchange theory; Evolutionary game theory; STRONG RECIPROCITY; COOPERATION; LOGIC;
D O I
10.1007/s10988-020-09315-6
中图分类号
H0 [语言学];
学科分类号
030303 ; 0501 ; 050102 ;
摘要
Politeness in conversation is a fascinating aspect of human interaction that directly interfaces language use and human social behavior more generally. We show how game theory, as a higher-order theory of behavior, can provide the tools to understand and model polite behavior. The recently proposed responsibility exchange theory (Chaudhry and Loewenstein in Psychol Rev 126(3):313-344, 2019) describes how the polite communications of thanking and apologizing impact two different types of an agent's social image: (perceived) warmth and (perceived) competence. Here, we extend this approach in several ways, most importantly by adding a cultural-evolutionary dynamics that makes it possible to investigate the evolutionary stability of politeness strategies. Our analysis shows that in a society of agents who value status-related traits (such as competence) over reciprocity-related traits (such as warmth), both the less and the more polite strategies are maintained in cycles of cultural-evolutionary change.
引用
收藏
页码:1181 / 1213
页数:33
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