Phenomenology of the Body and the Relationships with Others. Intersubjectivity through Intercorporeality

The article presents an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body and perception in relation to the field of interpersonal relationships and social interaction taking place in the intersubjective space of the human world. Despite Merleau-Ponty's statement that perception is what opens us to the world, we find that perception itself cannot be separated from the affect through which the (intersubjective) world is given to us. The analysis of the interaction with other subjects, or "alter egos," according to Husserl, is transformed by Merleau-Ponty into the analysis of concrete interaction between living bodies, wherein already acquired knowledge and experiences are inscribed, most of which are no longer accessible to representation and judgment. In this way, it is possible to understand our daily functioning in the social environment through the primary intercorporeality, which is the basis of social cognition and empathy. In social interactions, our communication and understanding of others are based on corporeality, not by interpreting, simulating, and representing the mental states and intentions of others, but by directly perceiving the intentions, perceptions, feelings, and thoughts of other subjects in our own body.