Top executive gender, board gender diversity, and financing decisions: Evidence from debt structure choice

被引:74
作者
Datta, Sudip [1 ,4 ]
Doan, Trang [2 ]
Toscano, Francesca [3 ]
机构
[1] Wayne State Univ, Mike Ilitch Sch Business, Dept Finance, Detroit, MI 48202 USA
[2] Eastern Illinois Univ, Lumpkin Coll Business & Technol, Charleston, IL 61920 USA
[3] Mike Ilitch Sch Business, Dept Finance, Detroit, MI USA
[4] Univ Michigan, Stephen M Ross Sch Business, Finance, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
Debt maturity structure; Top executive gender; Gender-based financial decision-making; MATURITY STRUCTURE; CHARACTER STRENGTHS; OVERCONFIDENT CEOS; LIQUIDITY RISK; CFO GENDER; CORPORATE; DETERMINANTS; WOMEN; FIRM; COMPENSATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106070
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Gender diversity in the C-suite and the boardroom have taken on greater importance in recent years. We establish a gender-based behavioral dimension to corporate debt maturity choice. Female executives choose a significantly shorter debt maturity structure compared to their male counterparts. However, their influence on debt maturity is inversely related to the proportion of their incentive compensation. Additionally, we find a substitution effect that moderates the relationship between executive gender and debt maturity structure as board gender diversity increases. Further, we find that firms led by females benefit from higher corporate credit ratings thus showing that the greater ethical sensitivities of female top executives compensate for the refinancing risk commonly associated with shorter-term debt. Transitions from male-to-female executive(s) result in shortening of debt maturity over the post-transition period. Our results survive a battery of robustness tests, including endogeneity, and contribute at the confluence of gender-based governance and corporate financial decision-making literatures. ? 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Gender diversity in the C-suite and the boardroom have taken on greater importance in recent years. We establish a gender-based behavioral dimension to corporate debt maturity choice. Female executives choose a significantly shorter debt maturity structure compared to their male counterparts. However, their influence on debt maturity is inversely related to the proportion of their incentive compensation. Additionally, we find a substitution effect that moderates the relationship between executive gender and debt maturity structure as board gender diversity increases. Further, we find that firms led by females benefit from higher corporate credit ratings thus showing that the greater ethical sensitivities of female top executives compensate for the refinancing risk commonly associated with shorter-term debt. Transitions from male-to-female executive(s) result in shortening of debt maturity over the post-transition period. Our results survive a battery of robustness tests, including endogeneity, and contribute at the confluence of gender-based governance and corporate financial decision-making literatures.
引用
收藏
页数:17
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