Quantity-Setting Competition Under Uncertain Demand

被引：0

作者：

Ferreira, Fernanda A. ^{[1
]}

Ferreira, Flavio ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Inst Politecn Porto, ESEIG, P-4480876 Vila Do Conde, Portugal

来源：

WORLD CONGRESS ON ENGINEERING 2009, VOLS I AND II | 2009年

关键词：

Industrial Organization; Game Theory; Cournot model; uncertainty; 1ST MOVER; FLEXIBILITY; INFORMATION; COMMITMENT; LEADERSHIP; DUOPOLY;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP301 [理论、方法];

学科分类号：

081202 ;

摘要：

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

引用

页码：1052 / 1055

页数：4

共 18 条

[1] STACKELBERG LEADERSHIP AS A NATURAL SOLUTION UNDER COST UNCERTAINTY [J].

ALBAEK, S .

JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1990, 38 (03) :335-347

[2]

[Anonymous], 1897, Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth

[3]

BERTRAND J, 1883, J SAVANTS, P303

[4]

Ferreira F., 2008, INTELLIGENT ENG SYST, P399

[5] 1ST MOVER AND 2ND MOVER ADVANTAGES [J].

GALOR, E .

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1985, 26 (03) :649-653

[6] 1ST MOVER DISADVANTAGES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION [J].

GALOR, E .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1987, 54 (02) :279-292

[7]

HAMILTON JH, 1990, GAME ECON BEHAV, P29

[8]

HIROKAWA H, 2001, B ECON RES, P19

[9]

KULTTI K, 1998, FINNISH J BUSINESS E, P24

[10]

LAGERLOF J, 2006, TOPICS THEORETICAL E

← 1 2 →