Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future

被引：78

作者：

Camera, Gabriele ^{[1
]}

Casari, Marco ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Iowa, Dept Econ, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA

[2] Purdue Univ, I-40126 Bologna, Italy

[3] Univ Bologna, I-40126 Bologna, Italy

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2009年 / 99卷 / 03期

关键词：

PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAMES; REPEATED PLAY; TRUST GAME; EQUILIBRIUM; REPUTATION; COMMUNICATION; COORDINATION; ENFORCEMENT; STRATEGIES; MANAGEMENT;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.99.3.979

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely. Can these economies achieve full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions? Which institutions for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation? Finally,, what classes of strategies do subjects employ? We find that, first, cooperation can be sustained even in anonymous settings; second, some type of monitoring and punishment institutions significantly promote cooperation; and, third, subjects mostly employ strategies that are selective in punishment. (JEL C71, C73. D12, Z13)

引用

页码：979 / 1005

页数：27

共 45 条

[1] Anonymous markets and monetary trading [J].