Strictly Strong (n-1)-equilibrium in n-person Multicriteria Games

被引：0

作者：

Kuzyutin, Denis V. ^{[1
]}

Nikitina, Mariya V. ^{[2
]}

Pankratova, Yaroslavna B. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] St Petersburg State Univ, Fac Appl Math & Control Proc, Univ Str Pr 35, St Petersburg 198504, Russia

[2] Int Banking Inst, Nevski Pr 60, St Petersburg 191023, Russia

来源：

CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL VII | 2014年 / 7卷

关键词：

multicriteria games; Pareto equilibria; strong equilibrium; consistency; axiomatizations; CONSISTENCY; EQUILIBRIA;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Using some specific approach to the coalition-consistency analysis in n-person multicriteria games we introduce two refinements of (weak Pareto) equilibria: the strong and strictly strong (n - 1)-equilibriums. Axiomatization of the strictly strong (n - 1)-equilibria (on closed families of multicriteria games) is provided in terms of consistency, strong one-person rationality, suitable variants of Pareto optimality and converse consistency axiom and others.

引用

页码：181 / 190

页数：10

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