Incentives and organizations in the public sector - An interpretative review

被引:430
作者
Dixit, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3069614
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper begins with a brief overview of the theory of incentives, with special attention to issues that are important in the public sector, in general and human capital in particular. It then reviews some case studies and empirical studies of incentives in the public sector, examining how these studies relate to the theory. Some implications for reform and design of organizations are drawn.
引用
收藏
页码:696 / 727
页数:32
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